Remuneration report
Reward philosophy:
The Motus remuneration policy is formulated to attract and retain high-calibre executives and motivate them to develop and implement the Group’s strategy to optimise long-term shareholder value.
JJ Njeke
Remuneration Committee Chairman
On behalf of the Remuneration Committee (RemCo), I am pleased to present my first remuneration report, which sets out the remuneration governance, setting of policies, determining remuneration and its implementation for the financial year.
I would like to thank Mr. GW Dempster and Mr. A Tugendhaft, for their insightful contribution that allows RemCo to perform its duties effectively and efficiently.
Background statement
RemCo welcome and consider the views of shareholders in our deliberations, which begins with ensuring that our disclosures relating to executive remuneration is transparent. We are careful not to depart from the expectations set by the performance criteria, even when factors outside our control stifle or enhance performance. We believe the remuneration policies in place appropriately incentivise long-term strategic decision-making that serves sustainable value creation. Throughout the Group, we attempt to compensate individuals fairly for a specific role, with due regard to their skills, areas in which they operate and their specific performance.
At the 2021 AGM, 98% of shareholders voted in favour of both the Group's remuneration policy and of its implementation. As a result of our ongoing interactions with shareholders, we continuously implement changes, which relate to the remuneration policy and enhance the disclosures in the implementation report.
Key focus areas
The Group regularly benchmarks the remuneration packages of the non-executive directors, executive directors, and senior staff members with the assistance of independent remuneration specialists. A detailed benchmarking exercise was performed in the prior year. The review included: total guaranteed pay (TGP), short-term incentives (STIs), long-term incentives (LTIs), key performance criteria and the constituents of the peer group. Findings confirmed that the respective remuneration packages are aligned to the market and the remuneration mix has a higher proportion of variable pay, which supports the Group's pay-for-performance reward philosophy.
RemCo have approved the following, which is consistent with prior years:
- The general composition of executive remuneration packages.
- The key performance criteria for STI and LTI awards, including the composition of the peer group.
- Salary increases, STI, and LTI awards made to executive management in accordance with set performance criteria.
- Minimum shares to be held by executive directors and prescribed officers.
- The remuneration of non-executive and executive directors, prescribed officers and business unit leaders.
Shareholder engagement and changes to remuneration policy and disclosure
In keeping with the recommended practices of King IV, both the
remuneration policy and its implementation will be tabled for
shareholder approval by
separate non-binding advisory votes at the AGM
on 2 November 2022. RemCo and the board will continue to consider the
views expressed by shareholders and we remain deeply committed to
sound governance, responsible decision-making and transparency on
executive compensation.
Should 25% or more of the voting rights exercised at the 2022 AGM be voted against the remuneration policy and/or its implementation, the board will in good faith commence engaging with shareholders to ascertain the reasons and take steps to address their valid objections and concerns raised, which may include amending the remuneration policy or clarifying or adjusting remuneration governance and/or processes.
The board will also disclose the steps taken to address any concerns that may be raised.
The committee will continue to provide guidance to the board on director and prescribed officer remuneration, and ensure that the remuneration policy and its implementation are in line with the Group's remuneration philosophy.
JJ Njeke
RemCo Chairman
26 September 2022
Remuneration Committee
Committee Chairman
The committee is chaired by Mr. MJN Njeke, an independent non-executive director. Mr. MJN Njeke, was appointed as Chairman of RemCo from 3 November 2021, when Mr. A Tugendhaft stepped down as Chairman while remaining a member of RemCo.
Role of the committee
RemCo advises and guides the board on the following:
- Accurate and transparent disclosure of directors' remuneration.
- The establishment and implementation of remuneration policies for non-executive directors, executive directors, and other executives, to ensure fair and responsible remuneration.
- Approval of the general composition of remuneration packages for executive directors and prescribed officers, including increases, criteria for STI and LTI incentives, benchmarked against the appropriate peer group.
- Remuneration increases to non-executive directors' fees to be proposed for shareholder approval.
- Material changes to the Group pension and provident funds, and medical aid schemes where appropriate.
- The administration of share-based incentive schemes.
- Ad hoc advice on remuneration and related issues impacting the Group's executives.
The NomCo and RemCo consider succession plans regularly for executives and non-executive directors and senior management. This process includes:
- The identification of current incumbents in key positions.
- An assessment of how long the current incumbent is expected to remain in the position.
- Identification of candidates that are vulnerable due to age, health, or attractiveness to competitors.
- Identification of potential short-term and long-term successors, both internally and externally.
- Positioning and development of potential successors.
Committee membership
All members are non-executive directors, and the majority are independent. Mr. A Tugendhaft, who is a non-executive director, is not classified as independent in terms of King IV, as his firm, TWB, provides legal services to the Group. Mr. A Tugendhaft, however, provides continuity and guidance on account of his seniority and longstanding RemCo membership.
The Group CEO and CFO attend RemCo meetings by invitation and assist the committee in its deliberations, except when their own remuneration and performance are discussed. No director can decide his or her own remuneration.
| Members | Attendance |
| Chairman: MJN Njeke1 | 4/4 |
|---|---|
| Members: | |
| GW Dempster | 4/4 |
| A Tugendhaft2 | 4/4 |
| 1 | Appointed as Chairman on 3 November 2021. |
| 2 | Resigned as Chairman on 3 November 2021 and remains a member. |
Reward philosophy
The remuneration policy is formulated to attract and retain
high-calibre executives and motivate them to develop and implement the
Group's strategy to optimise
long-term shareholder value. It also aims
to align the entrepreneurial ethos and long-term interests of senior
managers and executives with those of shareholders. The company's pay
mix has a higher proportion of variable pay, appropriate for the
retail nature of the business and in line with the pay-for-performance
reward philosophy.
Fair and responsible remuneration
The remuneration policy is intended to conform to best practice. It is structured around the following key principles:
- Total rewards are set at levels that are responsible and competitive within the relevant market.
- Incentive-based rewards (STIs and LTIs) are capped and earned through the achievement of sustainability, growth and return targets that are consistent with shareholder interests over the short, medium and long term.
- Incentive plans, performance measures and targets are structured to remain sound throughout the business cycle.
- The design and implementation of STI and LTI schemes are prudent and do not expose shareholders to unreasonable financial risk.
Alignment to strategy
Our strategic focus is centred on deepening our competitiveness and relevance across the automotive value chain, by driving organic growth through optimisation and innovation, and leveraging existing capabilities and networks. Further selective expansion involves the introduction of additional brands and businesses in areas close to existing dealerships via bolt-on acquisitions locally and internationally, strategic acquisitions in the Aftermarket Parts business to enhance the supply chain, and bolt-on acquisitions of technology companies to enhance the Mobility Solutions business.
Our five strategic pillars include:

The individual’s performance measurement criteria are aligned to the achievement of the Group’s strategies.
Determination of performance incentives
Motus has various formal and informal frameworks for performance management that are directly linked either to increases in TGP and/or annual STIs. Performance management and assessment take place regularly throughout the Group, where company performance, personal achievement of key performance criteria, and delivery on key strategic imperatives are discussed.
| 2022 | 2021 | ||
| Total number of employees | 17 283 | 16 708 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total compensation paid to employees (Rm) | 7 307 | 6 606 |
Remuneration breakdown
The Group's employees are crucial to our success. Employee remuneration, particularly TGP, is a significant component of the Group's total operating costs. The remuneration policy seeks to attract and retain quality employees at all levels. Remuneration is structured to be competitive and relevant in the sectors in which the Group operates.
Salaried employees
| Total guaranteed pay (TGP) |
|
|
| Short-term incentive (STI) |
Divisions pay STIs aligned to industry best practice. In all cases, incentives depend on the performance of the individual and business in which they are employed. Performance criteria are set for each individual, depending on the requirements of the job. |
|
| Long-term incentive (LTI) | Senior management qualify for LTIs. | |
| Other benefits | Company car, travel allowances, pension and provident fund, and medical aid. |
Reduction or forfeiture of share scheme awards (malus and clawback)
Share scheme awards are subject to reduction or forfeiture (in whole or in part) if:
- There is reasonable evidence of fraud or material error by a participant; or
- The financial performance of the Group or the relevant business unit for any financial year in respect of which an award is based have subsequently appeared to be materially inaccurate; or
- The Group or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance, for which the participant can be held responsible; or
- Resignation or dismissal on grounds of misconduct, poor performance or proven dishonest or fraudulent conduct (whether such cessation occurs as a result of notice given by the employee or otherwise or if he/she resigns to avoid dismissal on grounds of misconduct, poor performance or proven dishonest or fraudulent conduct) before the vesting date, all share appreciation rights, conditional awards and all matching awards will lapse, unless RemCo determines otherwise.
Vesting of any awards may be postponed while there is an ongoing investigation or other procedure underway, to determine whether the forfeiture provisions apply in respect of a participant, or if further investigation is warranted.
Retirement, retrenchment, death, ill health, disability or other reasons for cessation of employment
If a participant ceases to be an employee due to retirement at normal retirement age, the unvested Share Appreciation Rights (SARs) and Conditional Share Plans (CSPs) will remain subject to the performance criteria and will vest on the normal vesting date.
If a participant ceases to be an employee due to retrenchment, death, ill health, disability, or reasons other than resignation or dismissal, the board will by written notice to the participant or the executor of the deceased estate permit a pro rata portion of the unvested SARs and CSPs to vest on the date of cessation of employment.
The pro rata portion of the SARs and CSPs that vest will, unless the board determines otherwise, reflect the number of months served since the date of grant and the extent to which the performance conditions have been satisfied. The balance of the unvested shares not permitted to be exercised or matched will lapse.
Treasury shares to hedge against share scheme obligations
The Group buys back shares to limit its exposure to deliver shares in terms of share-based LTI schemes. These shares are held in treasury for that purpose.
Retirement schemes
Executives participate in contributory retirement schemes, which include pension and provident funds. Executive retirement is governed by their retirement scheme rules, subject to the Group's need to enter into fixed-term contracts to extend the services of any executive within certain prescribed limits.
NomCo governs the succession policy and plans, external appointments and directors' service contracts covered below. These items are included in the report as both the NomCo and RemCo are relevant decision-makers on these matters.
External appointments
Executives are not permitted to hold external directorships or offices without the approval of the board.
Directors' service contracts
Directors' contracts can be terminated by providing between three- and six-months' notice.
Directors' appointments are made in terms of the company's MOI and are initially confirmed at the first AGM of shareholders following their appointment, and thereafter by rotation.
Minimum shareholding requirements (MSR)
To ensure alignment between executives and shareholders, and on the recommendation of management, the Group adopted an MSR for executive directors and prescribed officers.
Each executive's MSR target is determined using the executive's TGP after tax. The target must be achieved within five years from 1 July 2019 (or from the joining date for new appointees), unless otherwise determined by RemCo considering market conditions and related factors. It is not the intention of the scheme to compel executives to incur debt to acquire Motus shares but rather that executives should retain shares acquired through the operation of share incentive schemes up to the MSR target.
Compliance with the MSR will be measured annually and executives subject to MSR will have to declare the extent of their personal shareholdings in the company at each year-end or as and when directed by the company. RemCo will assess compliance with the MSR before making future discretionary LTI awards.
MSR targets are set as follows:
MSR target |
Required achievement date |
MSR achievement |
|
| CEO | 1,5 times post-tax annual fixed remuneration | 30 June 2024 | Achieved in 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CFO | 1,25 times post-tax annual fixed remuneration | 30 June 2024 | Achieved in 2019 |
| Executive directors and prescribed officers | 1 times post-tax annual fixed remuneration | ||
| Kerry Cassel | 30 June 2024 | On track to achieve target by 30 June 2023 | |
| Niall Lynch | 30 June 2024 | Achieved in 2019 | |
| Corné Venter | 30 June 2024 | On track to achieve target by 30 June 2023 | |
| Ntando Simelane | 30 June 2026 | On track to achieve target by 30 June 2026 |
Non-executive directors' fees
RemCo reviews and recommends to the board the fees payable to
non-executive directors. The board in turn makes recommendations to
shareholders after considering the fees paid by comparable companies,
responsibilities of the non-executive directors and considerations
relating to the retention and attraction of
high-calibre individuals.
RemCo has decided to maintain a structure where directors' fees are not
split between membership and attendance fees. We believe that the efforts
and contribution of non-executive directors go well beyond their
attendance at formal board or sub-committee meetings, and the Group has
not had significant instances of non-attendance of meetings.
Executive directors, prescribed officers and senior business executives (executives)
Executives are responsible for leading others and making significant decisions about the short- and long-term operation of the business, its assets, funders and employees. They require specific skills and experience and are held to a higher level of accountability.
Elements of executive remuneration
Executive remuneration comprises the following:
-
Total guaranteed pay
-
Short-term incentive (STI) (annual)
-
Long-term incentive (LTI) through the share scheme.
RemCo seeks to ensure an appropriate balance between the fixed and performance-related elements of executive remuneration, and between those aspects of the package linked to short-term performance and those linked to longer-term shareholder value creation.
The Group's general philosophy for executive remuneration is that the performance-based pay of executives and senior managers should form a significant portion of their expected total compensation. There should also be an appropriate balance between rewarding operational performance (through annual incentives) and rewarding long-term sustainable performance (through long-term share-based incentives). Since Motus operates in the Retail sector, STIs are critical to incentivise divisional CEOs and senior team members to achieve annual targets.
Total guaranteed pay (TGP)
TGP is fixed remuneration including benefits but excluding STIs. The TGP of each executive is based on roles in similar companies, which are comparable in terms of size, market sector, business complexity and international scope. When determining fixed remuneration, the factors relating to divisional performance, individual performance and changes in responsibilities are considered.
Executives are entitled to vehicle benefits, pension and/or provident fund contributions, medical insurance, and death and disability insurance. These benefits are considered to be market related for executives.
Short-term incentive (STI)
All executives are eligible to receive a performance related STI. The incentive is non-contractual and not pensionable. RemCo reviews incentives annually and determines the level of each incentive payment based on performance criteria set at the beginning of the performance period.
RemCo sets the minimum performance targets at which annual STIs become payable and the targets at which the maximum incentive is paid. STIs are capped at maximum levels as a percentage of TGP. RemCo has the discretionary authority to adjust payments (up or down) in exceptional circumstances.
| Maximum STI as % of TGP | |
| CEO and CFO | 150 |
|---|---|
| Executive director | 100 |
| Other participants | 30 to 100 |
The annual STI criteria for executive directors and prescribed officers include the following. Criteria are adjusted annually or on an ad hoc basis when individual's responsibilities are amended.
Annual STI criteria for the 2023 financial year
The CEO and CFO’s 2023 STI criteria will include:
| Maximum STI as % of TGP |
||||
| Achieve targeted Group operating profit | 35 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Achieve targeted Group operating profit before tax (PBT) | 35 | |||
| Achieve targeted average debt to EBITDA | 30 | |||
| Strategy execution | 15 | |||
| – Consolidating dealership footprint, including multi-franchising | ||||
| – Investment in IT and innovation | ||||
| – Strategic acquisitions | ||||
| Achieve ESG targets | 25 | |||
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| Individual performance: | 10 | |||
|
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| Maximum as a percentage of TGP | 150 | |||
The 2023 STI criteria for the executive director will include:
| Maximum STI as % of TGP |
||||
| Achieve targeted Group operating profit | 25 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Achieve divisional PBT target | 35 | |||
| Strategy execution | 10 | |||
| – Successful execution of internal IT projects and innovation | ||||
| – Expansion of technology product offerings | ||||
| Achieve ESG targets | 20 | |||
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| Individual performance: | 10 | |||
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| Maximum as a percentage of TGP | 100 | |||
The 2023 STI criteria for the prescribed officers will include:
| Maximum STI as % of TGP |
||||
| Achieve Group operating profit target | 15 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Achieve divisional operating profit target | 30 | |||
| Achieve cash management target | 10 | |||
| Achieve ESG targets | 25 | |||
|
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10 | |||
| Market share/specific projects/strategy execution | 10 | |||
| Individual performance: | ||||
|
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| Maximum as a percentage of TGP | 100 | |||
The 2023 STI criteria for the Company Secretary and Head of Legal Counsel will include:
| Maximum STI as % of TGP |
||||||||
| Achieve targeted Group operating profit | 16 | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Achieve ESG targets | 16 | |||||||
|
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| Specifi c projects (legal and governance projects) | 26 | |||||||
| Individual performance: | 7 | |||||||
|
||||||||
| Maximum as a percentage of TGP | 65 | |||||||
Long-term (LTI) schemes
Executive participation in LTI and retention schemes is based on criteria such as seniority, performance during the year and other retention drivers. Any senior employee with significant managerial or other responsibility, including any director holding salaried employment or office in the Group, is eligible to participate in LTI schemes. Non-executive directors may not be awarded rights in any of the incentive schemes.
Since 1 July 2020, the Group only uses the CSP as an LTI scheme. The SARs scheme and Deferred Bonus Plan (DBP) were previously used and shares were allocated under these schemes, these schemes have been discontinued.
The quantum of CSPs allocated are calculated using a model developed by independent remuneration consultants, and is determined using the expected value of an allocation expressed as a percentage of TGP. The percentage allocated is determined based on retention considerations and the job grading of the participant.
Benchmark awards for CSPs |
Maximum LTI award as %of TGP |
| CEO and CFO | 100 |
|---|---|
| Executive director | 75 |
| Other participants | 30 to 50 |
The CSPs were issued at R109,74 per share and will vest in September 2025.The value of long-term share-based incentives is determined in the financial year of allocation using the binomial tree valuation methodology. This is based on several assumptions, which include the original award price, the expected rate of share price growth and the expected fulfilment of related performance conditions. The eventual gains from long-term share-; based incentives will vary from year to year depending on vesting and exercise patterns, as well as the impact on share price performance and external factors such as market sentiment, interest rates and exchange rates.
Conditional share plan (CSP)
Employees receive grants of conditional awards and vesting is subject to performance conditions, as set out below. The performance conditions for the CSPs are based on performance targets set by RemCo at the time of issue.
| % of CSP awards |
|
| Growth in HEPS relative to the growth in HEPS of a selected peer group of JSE-listed companies | 25 |
|---|---|
| ROIC in excess of WACC plus 3%* | 25 |
| Achieve cash flow target | 25 |
| Individual performance | 25 |
* Previously ROIC in excess of WACC plus 1%.
The extent to which each performance condition has been met is determined on the vesting date as follows:
| HEPS growth over the performance period | % of CSP awards |
| If the HEPS growth of the company is below the lower quartile of the peer group | 0 |
|---|---|
| If the HEPS growth of the company is equal to the lower quartile of the peer group | 30 |
| If the HEPS growth of the company is equal to or above the upper quartile of the peer group | 100 |
Linear vesting occurs between the 30% and 100% range, depending on the company's performance relative to the peer group if HEPS growth falls in the second or third quartile.
ROIC |
% of CSP awards |
| If the average ROIC of the company over the performance period is lower than the average WACC plus 1% of the company over the performance period | 0 |
|---|---|
| If the average ROIC of the company over the performance period is equal to or in excess of the average WACC plus 1% of the company over the performance period | 50 |
| If the average ROIC of the company over the performance period is equal to or in excess of 3% of WACC | 100 |
Linear vesting occurs between the 50% and 100% range.
| Cash flow target | % of CSP awards |
| Average debt: EBITDA < 2,35 times | 25 |
|---|
Individual performance |
% of CSP awards |
| This component enables RemCo to set individual performance targets and assess these in circumstances that could not be foreseen at the start of the period or are not in the control of a particular executive | 25 |
|---|
Share scheme allocations
A total of 4 165 918 SARs remain unexercised in terms of the SARs scheme at an average price of R76,12 per share. A total of 4 221 217 CSPs have been allocated and remain unvested.
Annual share scheme allocations
The Group has awarded annual allocations of CSPs during September 2022 according to the allocation benchmarks in the remuneration policy.
The peer group of JSE-listed companies was selected based on a report prepared by independent remuneration consultants and considers comparative metrics including revenue, number of employees, industry and complexity.
| Current peer group | Sector |
| Barloworld Limited | Industrials |
|---|---|
| Bidvest Limited | Industrials |
| Clicks Group Limited | Consumer services |
| Combined Motor Holdings Limited | Consumer services |
| KAP Industrial Holdings Limited | Industrials |
| Massmart Holdings Limited | Consumer services |
| Mr Price Group Limited | Consumer services |
| Multichoice Group Limited | Consumer services |
| Pepkor Holdings Limited | Consumer goods |
| Pick n Pay Stores Limited | Consumer services |
| RCL Foods Limited | Consumer services |
| Super Group Limited | Industrials |
| The Spar Group Limited | Consumer services |
| Tiger Brands Limited | Consumer goods |
| Woolworths Holdings Limited | Consumer services |
Proposed non-executive directors' fees for 2023 and 2024
At the AGM to be held on 2 November 2022, shareholders will be asked to approve the following non-executive directors' remuneration by special resolution in terms of section 66(9) of the Companies Act, granting authority to pay fees for services as directors, which will be valid with effect from the date of the AGM until 30 June 2024.
The proposed increase in fees for the 2023 financial year is 5% and the 2024 financial year is 6% for the board and all its sub-committees.
The table below provides a breakdown per committee for the year ended 30 June 2022, as well as proposed fees for the years ended 30 June 2023 and 30 June 2024:
| Actual fee from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 |
Proposed fee from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2023 |
Proposed fee from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 |
|||
| Chairman* | R1 053 730 | R1 106 420 | R1 172 805 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deputy Chairman* | R526 870 | R553 215 | R586 408 | ||
| Board member | R301 340 | R316 410 | R335 395 | ||
| Asset and Liability Committee Chairman* | R192 069 | R201 675 | R213 776 | ||
| Asset and Liability Committee member | R127 870 | R134 265 | R142 321 | ||
| Audit and Risk Committee Chairman* | R397 940 | R417 840 | R442 910 | ||
| Audit and Risk Committee member | R198 970 | R208 920 | R221 455 | ||
| Remuneration Committee Chairman* | R143 790 | R150 980 | R160 039 | ||
| Remuneration Committee member | R95 510 | R100 285 | R106 302 | ||
| Nomination Committee Chairman* | R107 840 | R113 230 | R120 024 | ||
| Nomination Committee member | R71 628 | R75 210 | R79 723 | ||
| Social, Ethics and Sustainability Committee Chairman* | R192 600 | R202 230 | R214 364 | ||
| Social, Ethics and Sustainability Committee member | R127 870 | R134 265 | R142 321 |
* Fee paid in addition to a member's fee.
In determining the proposed fees, cognisance was taken of market trends and the additional responsibilities of non-executive directors in terms of increased legal and governance requirements.
Executive directors receive no directors' or committee fees for their services as directors in addition to their normal remuneration as employees.
Non-executive directors' fees for 2022
The table below provides an analysis of the emoluments paid to non-executive directors for the year to 30 June 2022:
| Non-executive directors | Directors’ fees R’000 |
Subcommittee fees R’000 |
2022 Total R’000 |
2021 Total R’000 |
|||
| GW Dempster | 1 356 | 595 | 1 951 | 1 857 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PJS Crouse | 301 | 128 | 429 | 250 | |||
| NB Duker | 301 | 199 | 500 | 285 | |||
| P Langeni1 | – | – | – | 141 | |||
| S Mayet | 301 | 725 | 1 026 | 977 | |||
| KR Moloko2 | – | – | – | 598 | |||
| MJN Njeke3 | 301 | 633 | 934 | 1 023 | |||
| F Roji4 | 251 | 272 | 523 | – | |||
| A Tugendhaft5 | 829 | 343 | 1 172 | 1 207 | |||
| Total | 3 640 | 2 895 | 6 535 | 6 338 |
| 1 | Resigned from the board, NomCo and RemCo on 10 November 2020. |
| 2 | Resigned from the board, ARC and SES Committee on 31 May 2021. |
| 3 | Appointed to NomCo and RemCo on 15 September 2020. Resigned as a member of ALCO on 1 August 2021 and as a member of ARC on 1 September 2021. Appointed as the Chairman of RemCo on 3 November 2021. |
| 4 | Appointed to the board, ARC and SES on 1 September 2021. |
| 5 | Resigned as Chairman of RemCo on 3 November 2021 and remains a member. |
Executive remuneration
The executive directors and prescribed officers’ remuneration include the TGP, STI, LTI.

Osman Arbee
Group CEO
2022 Remuneration
| 2022 R'000 |
2021 R'000 |
||
| Cash component | 10 801 | 10 302 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement and medical contributions | 529 | 469 | |
| Other benefits | 386 | 386 | |
| Total guaranteed package | 11 716 | 11 157 | |
| COVID-19 forfeiture | – | (557) | |
| STI bonus | 16 717 | 16 139 | |
| Total cash remuneration | 28 433 | 26 739 | |
| Gains on exercise of LTI awards | 19 694 | 4 682 | |
| Total remuneration realised | 48 127 | 31 421 |
TGP
Osman's TGP was increased by 5% for inflation. The 2021 TGP was reduced by 20% for the three months to 30 September 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis (R556 500). His TGP is R11 716 000 (2021: R10 600 000). The remuneration for this position was externally benchmarked in the prior year against companies with a similar size, complexity and geographic spread.
STI
Based on the computation (set out below) according to STI criteria set during July 2021 Osman achieved 95,3% of the criteria. An annual incentive of R16 716 700 was paid (2021: R16 138 500).
LTI
Based on the LTI criteria set during November 2018, Osman achieved 100% of the DBP criteria and 53% of the CSP criteria resulting in the vesting and exercise of LTI awards amounting to R19 694 444 (2021: R4 682 000).
Annual allocation of CSPs in line with LTI award benchmarks for executive directors to a value of R12 275 000 (2021: R11 690 000) were awarded in September 2022. The CSPs are subject to performance criteria set out above and will vest in 2025.

Ockert Janse van Rensburg
Group CFO
2022 Remuneration
| 2022 R'000 |
2021 R'000 |
||
| Cash component | 5 690 | 5 245 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement and medical contributions | 416 | 411 | |
| Other benefits | 178 | 170 | |
| Total guaranteed package | 6 284 | 5 826 | |
| COVID-19 forfeiture | – | (218) | |
| STI bonus | 8 938 | 8 410 | |
| Total cash remuneration | 15 222 | 14 018 | |
| Gains on exercise of LTI awards | 11 432 | 859 | |
| Total remuneration realised | 26 654 | 14 877 |
TGP
Ockert's TGP was increased by 8% for inflation and additional responsibilities. The 2021 TGP reduced by 15% for the three months to 30 September 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis (R217 500). His TGP is R6 284 000 (2021: R5 608 000). The remuneration for this position was externally benchmarked in the prior year against companies with a similar size, complexity and geographic spread.
STI
Based on the computation (set out below) according to STI criteria set during July 2021, Ockert achieved 95,3% of the criteria. An annual incentive of R8 937 500 was paid (2021: R8 410 000).
LTI
Based on the LTI criteria set during November 2018, Ockert achieved 100% of the DBP criteria and 53% of the CSP criteria, and also exercised SARs that vested during 2015 and 2017, resulting in the vesting and exercise of LTI awards amounting to R11 432 369 (2021: R859 000).
Annual allocation of CSPs in line with LTI award benchmarks for executive directors to a value of R6 600 000 (2021: R6 250 000) were awarded in September 2022. The CSPs are subject to performance criteria set out above and will vest in 2025.
STI computation for the 2022 financial year for the CEO and CFO:
| Maximum STI as % of TGP |
Achievement: Osman Arbee |
Achievement: Ockert JV Rensburg |
Note | |||||||
| Achieve targeted Group operating profit | 35 | 35 | 35 | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Achieve targeted Group PBT | 35 | 35 | 35 | |||||||
| Achieve targeted average debt to EBITDA | 30 | 30 | 30 | |||||||
| Strategy execution | 15 | 15 | 15 | Note 1 | ||||||
|
||||||||||
| Achieve ESG targets | 25 | 18 | 18 | Note 2 | ||||||
|
||||||||||
| Individual performance | 10 | 10 | 10 | Note 3 | ||||||
| Maximum as a percentage of TGP | 150 | 143 | 143 | |||||||
| Achievement | 95,3 | 95,3 |
Notes to the STI computation:
-
Strategy execution
- The multi-franchise dealership footprint strategy was accelerated in South Africa with consolidation of the following sites: Menlyn, Bedfordview, Klerksdorp and Rustenburg.
- Strategic acquisition of FAI in the International Aftermarket Parts segment.
- Investment in IT and innovation, most notably the getWorth acquisition providing greater pre-owned vehicle valuation capabilities, and various other technology platform acquisitions and developments in the Mobility Solutions segment.
- Refinancing of local and international debt facilities with three to five-year maturity dates.
Osman and Ockert were awarded 15% (target 15%) for this criteria.
-
Achieve ESG targets
- Environmental: achieved fuel and electricity targets and marginal underachievement of the water usage target; invested in projects such as solar panels, electricity-saving equipment and water recycling on all new and refurbished buildings.
-
Social: achieved employment equity targets for top management, and
marginal underachievement in senior and middle management.
Black Prior year
%Actual
%Top management 36 50 Senior management 53 53 Middle management 47 50 - Governance: implemented all the required legislation changes impacting the business.
Osman and Ockert were awarded 18% (target 25%) for this criteria.
-
Individual performance
The CEO and CFO exceeded individual performance expectations in managing the business in a challenging economic environment. They were awarded their 10% (target 10%) allocation.

Kerry Cassel
CEO: Mobility Solutions & Head: Innovation and Technology
2022 Remuneration
| 2022 R'000 |
2021 R'000 |
||
| Cash component | 4 479 | 4 252 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement and medical contributions | 410 | 389 | |
| Other benefits | 264 | 210 | |
| Total guaranteed package | 5 153 | 4 851 | |
| COVID-19 forfeiture | – | (184) | |
| STI bonus | 4 893 | 4 900 | |
| Total cash remuneration | 10 046 | 9 567 | |
| Gains on exercise of LTI awards | 6 472 | 391 | |
| Total remuneration realised | 16 518 | 9 958 |
TGP
Kerry's TGP was increased by 5% for inflation. The 2021 TGP was reduced by 15% for the three months to 30 September 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis (R183 837). Her TGP is R5 153 000 (2021: R4 667 000). The remuneration for this position was externally benchmarked in the prior year against companies with a similar size, complexity and geographic spread.
STI
Based on the computation (set out below) according to STI criteria set during July 2021, Kerry achieved 95% of the set criteria. An annual incentive of R4 892 500 was paid (2021: R4 900 000).
LTI
Based on the LTI criteria set during November 2018, Kerry achieved 53% of the CSP criteria and 84% of the SAR criteria, and also exercised SARs that vested during 2015 and 2017, resulting in the vesting and exercise of LTI awards amounting to R6 472 010 (2021: R391 000).
Annual allocation of CSPs in line with LTI award benchmarks for executive directors to a value of R4 080 000 (2021: R3 862 500) were awarded in September 2022. The CSPs are subject to performance criteria set out above and will vest in 2025.
STI computation for the 2022 financial year for the executive director:
| Maximum STI as % of TGP |
Achievement |
Note | ||||
| Achieve targeted Group operating profit | 25 | 25 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Achieve targeted Group PBT | 35 | 35 | Note 1 | |||
| Strategy execution | 10 | 10 | Note 2 | |||
| – Successful execution of internal IT projects and innovation | ||||||
| – Expansion of technology product offerings | ||||||
| Achieve ESG targets | 20 | 15 | Note 3 | |||
|
||||||
|
||||||
|
||||||
| Individual performance | 10 | 10 | Note 4 | |||
| Maximum as a percentage of TGP | 100 | 95 | ||||
Notes to the STI computation:
-
Divisional profits
- Achieved in excess of 105% of target set in July 2021.
-
Strategy execution
- Investment and development in various technology platforms in the Mobility Solutions segment.
- Secured new income streams from new product developments.
Kerry was awarded 10% (target 10%) for this criteria.
-
ESG targets
- Environmental: achieved fuel and electricity targets and marginal underachievement of the water usage target; invested in projects such as solar panels, electricity-saving equipment and water recycling on all new and refurbished buildings.
- Social: achieved employment equity targets for middle and junior
management, and marginal underachievement in senior
management.
Black Prior year
%Actual
%Senior management 46 46 Middle management 47 50 Junior management 71 76
- Governance: implemented all the required legislation changes impacting the business and prepared the business for new legislation.
Kerry was awarded 15% (target 20%) for this criteria.
- Individual performance
Kerry exceeded individual performance expectations and was awarded a 10% (target 10%) allocation for this criteria.
Prescribed officer remuneration
Prescribed officers are persons, not being directors, who either alone or with others exercise executive control and management of the whole or a significant portion of the business of the company.

Corné Venter
CEO: Retail South Africa
2022 Remuneration
| 2022 R'000 |
2021 R'000 |
||
| Cash component | 3 870 | 3 593 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement and medical contributions | 497 | 453 | |
| Other benefits | 275 | 263 | |
| Total guaranteed package | 4 642 | 4 309 | |
| COVID-19 forfeiture | – | (161) | |
| STI bonus | 4 176 | 3 957 | |
| Total cash remuneration | 8 818 | 8 105 | |
| Gains on exercise of LTI awards | 4 066 | 636 | |
| Total remuneration realised | 12 884 | 8 741 |
TGP
Corné's TGP was increased by 8% for inflation and additional responsibilities. The 2021 TGP was reduced by 15% for the three months to 30 September 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis (R161 248). His TGP is R4 642 000 (2021: R4 148 000). The remuneration for this position was externally benchmarked in the prior year against companies with a similar size, complexity and geographic spread.
STI
Based on the computation (set out below) according to STI criteria set during July 2021, Corné achieved 90% of the set criteria. An annual incentive of R4 176 000 was paid (2021: R3 957 000).
LTI
Based on the LTI criteria set during November 2018, Corné achieved 100% of the DBP criteria and 53% of the CSPs criteria, and also exercised SARs that vested during 2015 and 2017, resulting in the vesting and exercise of LTI awards amounting to R4 065 599 (2021: R636 000).
Annual allocation of CSPs in line with LTI award benchmarks for an Executive Committee member and business unit leader to a value of R2 437 500 (2021: R3 248 000) were awarded in September 2022. The prior year allocation included a four-year allocation which was discontinued this year. The CSPs are subject to performance criteria set out above and will vest in 2025.

Niall Lynch
CEO: Hyundai South Africa
2022 Remuneration
| 2022 R'000 |
2021 R'000 |
||
| Cash component | 3 302 | 3 001 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement and medical contributions | 425 | 421 | |
| Other benefits | 275 | 255 | |
| Total guaranteed package | 4 002 | 3 677 | |
| COVID-19 forfeiture | – | (133) | |
| STI bonus | 3 960 | 3 800 | |
| Total cash remuneration | 7 962 | 7 344 | |
| Gains on exercise of LTI awards | 3 849 | 553 | |
| Total remuneration realised | 11 811 | 7 897 |
TGP
Niall's TGP was increased by 13% for inflation and additional responsibilities. The 2021 TGP was reduced by 15% for the three months to 30 September 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis (R133 125). His TGP is R4 002 000 (2021: R3 544 000). The remuneration for this position was externally benchmarked in the prior year against companies with a similar size, complexity and geographic spread.
STI
Based on the computation (set out below) according to STI criteria set during July 2021, see the STI computation below. Niall achieved 99% of the set criteria. An annual incentive of R3 960 000 was paid (2021: R3 800 000).
LTI
Based on the LTI criteria set during November 2018, Niall achieved 100% of the DBP criteria and 53% of the CSPs criteria, and also exercised SARs that vested during 2015 and 2017, resulting in the vesting and exercise of LTI awards amounting to R3 849 388 (2021: R553 000).
Annual allocation of CSPs in line with LTI award benchmarks for an Executive Committee member and business unit leader to a value of R2 175 000 (2021: R2 800 000) were awarded in September 2022. The prior year allocation included a four-year allocation which was discontinued this year. The CSPs are subject to performance criteria set out above and will vest in 2025.
STI computation for the 2022 financial year for the prescribed officers:
| Maximum STI as % of TGP |
Achievement: Corné Venter |
Achievement: Niall Lynch |
Note | ||||
| Achieve targeted Group operating profit | 15 | 15 | 15 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Achieved divisional PBT target | 30 | 30 | 30 | Note 1 | |||
| Achieving cash target | 10 | 10 | 10 | Note 1 | |||
| Achieve ESG targets | 25 | 18 | 24 | Note 2 | |||
|
|||||||
|
|||||||
|
|||||||
| Market share/specific projects/strategy execution | 10 | 10 | 10 | Note 3 | |||
| Individual performance | 10 | 7 | 10 | Note 4 | |||
| Maximum as a percentage of TGP | 100 | 90 | 99 | ||||
Notes to the STI computation:
- Divisional operating profit and cash targets
-
ESG targets
- Environmental: achieved fuel and electricity targets and marginal underachievement of the water usage target; invested in projects such as solar panels, electricity-saving equipment and water recycling on all new and refurbished buildings.
- Social:
Corné achieved, employment equity targets for senior and junior
management, with marginal underachievement for middle
management. Niall achieved employment equity targets for senior,
middle and junior management.
Black Retail and Rental: South Africa Prior year
%Actual
%Senior management 50 54 Middle management 43 43 Junior management 63 67 Black Hyundai South Africa Prior year
%Actual
%Senior management 50 50 Middle management 50 55 Junior management 69 76
- Governance: implemented all the required legislation changes impacting the business.
Corné was awarded 18% (target 25%) and Niall was awarded 24% (target 25%) for this criteria.
-
Market share/specific projects/strategy execution
- Corné: The multi-franchise dealership footprint strategy was accelerated in South Africa with the consolidation in Menlyn, Bedfordview, Klerksdorp and Rustenburg. The market share of operations under control increased during the year.
- Niall: grew Hyundai market share, including the launch of various new models.
Corné and Niall were awarded 10% (target 10%) for this criteria.
-
Individual performance
- Corné maintained individual performance criteria and was awarded 7% (target 10%) for this criteria.
- Niall exceeded individual performance expectations and was awarded 10% (target 10%) for this criteria.
Corné and Niall exceeded targets for these criteria.

Ntando Simelane
Company Secretary and Head of Legal Counsel
2022 Remuneration
| 2022 R'000 |
2021 R'000 |
||
| Cash component | 2 735 | 683 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement and medical contributions | 265 | 66 | |
| Other benefits | 2 | 1 | |
| Total guaranteed package | 3 002 | 750 | |
| COVID-19 forfeiture | – | – | |
| STI bonus | 1 814 | 1 000 | |
| Total cash remuneration | 4 816 | 1 750 | |
| Gains on exercise of LTI awards | – | – | |
| Total remuneration realised | 4 816 | 1 750 |
TGP
Ntando's TGP was R3 002 000 (2021: R750 000 as he was appointed 1 April 2021). The remuneration for this position was externally benchmarked in the prior year against companies with a similar size, complexity and geographic spread.
STI
Based on the computation (set out below) according to STI criteria set during July 2021, Ntando achieved 93% of the criteria. An annual incentive of R1 813 500 was paid (2021: R1 000 000 pre-determined annual incentive).
LTI
Annual allocation of CSPs in line with LTI award benchmarks for an Executive Committee member, Company Secretary and Legal Counsel to a value of R1 137 500 (2021: R1 050 000) were awarded in September 2022. The CSPs are subject to performance criteria set out above and will vest in 2025.
STI computation for the 2022 financial year for the Company Secretary and Head of Legal Counsel:
| Maximum STI as % of TGP |
Achievement | Note | ||||
| Achieve targeted Group operating profit | 16 | 16 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Achieve ESG targets | 16 | 12 | Note 1 | |||
|
||||||
|
||||||
|
||||||
| Specific projects (legal and governance projects) | 26 | 26 | Note 2 | |||
| Individual performance | 7 | 7 | Note 3 | |||
| Maximum as a percentage of TGP | 65 | 61 | ||||
Notes to the STI computation:
-
ESG targets
- Environmental: achieved fuel and electricity targets and marginal underachievement of the water usage target; Invested in projects such as solar panels, electricity-saving equipment and water recycling on all new and refurbished buildings.
- Social:achieved employment equity targets for top management, and
marginal underachievement in senior and middle management.
Black Prior year
%Actual
%Top management 36 50 Senior management 53 53 Middle management 47 50
- Governance: implemented all the required legislation changes impacting the business.
Ntando was awarded 12% (target 16%) for this criteria.
-
Specific projects (legal and governance projects)
- Ntando revamped the approval framework charter for the Group and streamlined processes to create a more effective legal and governance structure across the Group.
- Valuable input and guidance were provided during the sustainability-linked financing process.
- Individual performance
Ntando exceeded individual performance expectations and was awarded 7% (target 7%) for this criteria.







